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Abstract 
The scientific methodology of classical physics has been a constant influence in the 
development of orthodox economics. Clear signs of this can be found in the works of 
many classical economists such as Smith, Say, Cairnes  and Mill. The physics 
influence became more apparent with the emergence of marginalism. The economic 
thought of F. Y. Edgeworth, however, is the peak of the influence of classical physics 
to economics. In Edgeworth’s Mathematical Psychics, the identification of maximum 
energy in physics with that of the maximum pleasure in economic calculus, is central 
in his thought. In the same manner, I. Fisher, the founder of marginalism in the US, 
promoted a classical physics based economic methodology. The close analogy of 
physics and economics concepts and the application of tools from hydrodynamics to 
economic theory, are basic characteristics of his work. These views eventually 
dominated orthodox economic methodology. The paper argues that, apart from 
establishing the  physics scientific ideal in economics, both of these authors provided 
the methodological justification for its adoption in economics. It also  examines their 
subsequent influence on the formation of the current methodological approach in 
orthodox economics. In particular, it discusses  their influence on key components of 
current mainstream economics such as: extensive use of  mathematics, aversion to 
methodological discourse and anti-psychologism.   
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I. Introduction 
 
 
The desire to elevate the scientific status of economics to that of the physical 
sciences has a long presence in the history of economic analysis (e.g. Mirowski, 
1984). A number of key figures in the classical school such as A. Smith, J. B. Say and  
J. S. Mill viewed physical sciences as the ideal scientific model for economics. Thus, 
examples of the analogy between economics and physical sciences can be found in 
Smith (astronomy), Cairnes (chemistry), Say (chemistry and physics) and  Mill, 1874 
(geometry) (Smith, 1980ed, Cairnes, 1875; Say, 1803; Mill, 1874). The strive to 
imitate the methods of physics became much more apparent with the emergence of 
the marginalist school. Jevons’ assertion that the theory of economy presents a close 
analogy to the science of statical mechanics (Jevons, 1871, p.viii), and Walras’ 
prediction that mathematical economics will rank with the mathematical sciences of 
astronomy and mechanics (Walras, 1965, p.47, 48), are indicative examples in this 
respect. However, the work of second generation marginalist F. Y. Edgeworth, 
represents the highest point of physics and in particular, of classical physics 
methodological influence. In his main work Mathematical Psychics (1881), 
Edgeworth not only carried the analogy to its extreme, but also provided a thorough 
methodological justification. Similarly, the work of I. Fisher, the popularizer of 
marginalism and neoclassical economics in the US, also exhibits the same tendency.  
Fisher took  terms and concepts from classical physics (especially hydraulics) and 
transferred  them directly to economics, also providing the appropriate 
methodological basis for their use. Thus, the writings of those two influential 
economists were paramount   for the general acceptance of “economics being parallel 
to physics” methodological paradigm.  
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The physical science ideal has played, and still plays a key role in the 
formation of orthodox economic methodology (see also Debreu, 1991; Drakopoulos, 
1994). The paper discusses the development of this  ideal in the works of  Edgeworth 
and Fisher, also demonstrating that  these authors provided the methodological 
justification for its adoption in economics. It also examines the most important 
consequences of this methodological stance for contemporary mainstream economics. 
In particular, the paper argues that the high degree of formalism of current 
mainstream economic theory, the established tradition of anti-psychologism, and the 
relegation of  methodological critique, are the most important consequences of the 
physics methodological ideal. The paper starts with a discussion of the 
methodological approach of Edgeworth. The following section concentrates on  
Fisher’s methodological ideas. Section four examines the most important 
repercussions of their influence for contemporary mainstream economics, and the 
final section concludes.  
 
 
II. Edgeworth: Physics and Psychics 
 
For most historians of economic thought, Edgeworth is considered to be  one 
of the most influential figures of marginalism and of the early neoclassical economics. 
Edgeworth made extremely significant contributions  to numerous subfields of 
economics including  contract  and exchange theory, the theory of monopoly and 
duopoly and taxation theory. However, the impact of  his methodological approach 
for the subsequent development of mainstream economic methodology has not been 
adequately appreciated by most economic methodologists. More specifically, 
Edgeworth’s most important work “Mathematical Psychics: An Essay of the 
Application of Mathematics to Moral Sciences” (1881) sets the basis for the 
 4 
methodological justification of formalism in social sciences and particularly in 
economics.  Methodological arguments supporting the use of mathematics in 
economics  can be found in the works of  previous theorists such as Cournot, Jevons, 
and Walras (Turk, 2012). However, Edgeworth provides a very systematic 
methodological grounding for the use of mathematics in the study of social 
phenomena and more importantly, of the methodological ideal of physics. In this 
sense, Edgeworth’s work represents the height of the physics emulation in the history 
of economic discourse. The opening page of  his main work is indicative: 
 An Analogy is suggested between the Principles of Greatest Happiness, 
Utilitarian or Egoistic, which constitute the first Principles of Ethics and 
Economics, and those Principles of Maximum Energy which are among the 
highest generalizations of Physics and in virtue of which mathematical 
reasoning is applicable to physical phenomena quite as complex as human life 
(Edgeworth,1881, p.v) 
 
His next step is to provide a detailed methodological justification for the close 
analogy between physics and social sciences and particularly, economics. The first 
argument supporting the employment of  the methods of mathematical physics to 
social science, is based on the assumption that every social  phenomenon is the 
concomitant of a  physical phenomenon . As he states: 
The application of mathematics to the world of soul is countenanced by the 
hypothesis (agreeable to the general hypothesis that every psychical 
phenomenon is the concomitant, and in some sense the other side of a physical 
phenomenon), the particular hypothesis adopted in these pages, that Pleasure is 
the concomitant of  Energy. Energy may be regarded as the central idea of 
Mathematical Physics; maximum energy the object of principal investigations in 
that science. By aid of this conception we reduce into scientific order physical 
phenomena, the complexity of which may be compared with the complexity 
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which appears so formidable in Social Science. (Edgeworth,1881, p.9, italics in 
original). 
 
Given the close connection of  Energy and Pleasure, the maximization principle in the 
social sciences mentioned in the opening quotation, is easier to be accepted as a 
fundamental concept in economics.  
 The second  important  reason for the application of mathematics to economics 
is the  quantitative nature of the discipline. In Edgeworth’s words: 
Quantity of labour, quantity of pleasure, quantity of sacrifice and enjoyment, 
greatest average happiness, these are no dreams of German metaphysics, but the 
leading thought of leading Englishmen and corner-stone conceptions, upon 
which rest the whole systems of Adam Smith, of Jeremy Bentham, of John Mill, 
and of Henrey Sidgwick. (Edgeworth,1881, pp.97,98) 
  
In order to respond to the plausible  point that data in physics is much more 
sophisticated than data in economics, Edgeworth argues that the lack of precise 
numerical data  and exact functional relations in economics, is not an obstacle to the 
application of mathematical methods. He even  cites the example of hydrodynamics 
where the available data is similar to economic data and where relations among 
variables are central (Edgeworth,1881, pp.4,5). 
The application of mathematics and tools from physics is greatly facilitated by 
the combination of Utilitarianism with economics under the methodology of 
"mathematical psychics" (see also Creedy 1986, Mirowski, 1984; 1994). Therefore,  
the central idea of the ‘Hedonic Calculus’ is the maximization of  utility which 
naturally facilitates the application of  optimization methods from physics to 
economics. The following passage  is representative of his views on this matter: 
Now, it is remarkable that the principal inquires in Social Science may be 
viewed as maximum-problems. For Economics  investigates the arrangements 
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between agents each tending to his own maximum utility; and Politics and 
(Utilitarian) Ethics investigate the arrangements which conclude to the 
maximum sum total of utility. Since, then, Social Science, as compared with the 
Calculus of Variations, starts from similar data -loose quantitative relations-and 
travels to a similar conclusion –determination of maximum- why should it not 
pursue the same method, Mathematics? (Edgeworth,1881, pp.6,7 italics in 
original). 
 
Following the above arguments, Edgeworth provides many specific examples 
demonstrating specific applications of  mathematical reasoning appropriate to 
economics. The case of the calculus of variations is central: 
[i]t is the first principle of the calculus of variations that a varying quantity 
attains a maximum when the first term of variation vanishes, while the second 
term is negative (mutatis mutandis, for a minimum)… In the simple cases which 
in the infancy of Mathematical Psychics are along presented in these pages, we 
know by observation not what the second term is, but that it is continually 
negative (Edgeworth,1881, p. 91).  
 
The aim of  a unified science of physical and mental phenomena  can be found 
in his notion of  'psychophysics’.  Edgeworth often cites contemporary works in 
psychology and especially the work of psychophysicists such as Weber, Fechner, 
Wundt. One can note here the contrast with the subsequent aversion by most orthodox 
theorists  of  incorporating research from psychology into economics.  In particular, 
Edgeworth states: 
This ‘moral arithmetic’ is perhaps to be supplemented by moral differential 
calculus, the Fechnerian method applied to pleasures in general. For Wundt has 
shown that sensuous pleasures may thereby be measured, and, as utilitarians 
hold, all pleasures are commensurable. (Edgeworth,1881, p.60)  
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Edgeworth was very supportive of employing the  findings of  psychophysics 
into the economic and utilitarian calculus. A good example  in this respect, is  
Fechner’s Law which relates the quantity of sensation  to the quantity of stimulus 
(intensity of stimulus), and the stimulus threshold. In  his previous work (1877), 
Edgeworth modified this “Law” in view of his subsequent hedonic calculus as 
follows: 
pi = k│f (y)− f (β )│ 
  
where  the symbols pi , k , f , y and β respectively denote, ‘the pleasure of a sentient 
element’, ‘capacity for pleasure’, a function which the first differential is positive and 
the second is negative, the quantity of pleasure for stimulus and ‘the “threshold”, the 
lowest value of stimulus for which there is sense of pleasure at all’, while β and k are 
co-efficients’ (Edgeworth 1877, p.42). He will employ this relationship in order to set 
a basis for his utilitarian calculus where he ultimately links it to the Bentham’s 
Greatest Happiness Principle and even to the Malthusian relationship between the 
quantity of food and the level of population (see also Newman, 1987, pp.90-91). 
Furthermore, Edgeworth contributed to the spread of statistical methods in economics. 
His works “Methods of Statistics” (1885) and  ‘Observation and Statistics’ (1887) 
became extremely influential for the theory and application of statistical techniques to 
social and economic data ( see also Stigler 1986; Baccini, 2007). 
Edgeworth’s work and especially his Mathematical Psychics, represents the 
peak of the combination of the application of mathematical and physics tools  to 
economics. His identification of maximum energy of physics with that of the 
maximum pleasure in economic calculus, is Edgeworth’s central idea. In addition,  his 
conception of man as a pleasure machine clearly implies the legitimacy of  
incorporating psychophysics into economic theory. Therefore, Edgeworth’s work 
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represents the quintessence of the strive to transform economics into exact science on 
a par with physical sciences.  
 
III. Fisher: Hydraulics and Economics 
Edgeworth’s methodological stance  gained momentum among subsequent 
main figures in the history of mainstream economics. Thus, after Edgeworth, there 
was further incorporation of mathematics and methods from mathematical physics  in 
economic theory. The next figure who contributed to the formation of current ideas 
about method in economics was Irwin  Fisher who  is considered to be one of the 
most important promoters  of marginalism in America. According to many specialists, 
Irving Fisher, accomplished the most thoroughgoing mathematization of marginalist 
theory (e.g. Breslau, 2003; Zouboulakis, 2003). In line with Edgeworth, his 
methodological viewpoint is focused on the direct analogy between economics and 
physics. The approval of  Edgeworth to Fishers’ approach can be seen by 
Edgeworth’s book  review of Mathematical Investigations in the Economic Journal 
(1893). Edgeworth speaks highly of this work and especially Fisher’s use of  
analogies from physics.  He praises Fisher’s analogy of economic and mechanical 
phenomena and especially the illustration of  pure economics with hydrodynamics 
(Edgeworth, 1893). 
One of Fisher’s doctoral supervisors was the influential theoretical physicist  
Willard  Gibbs. Fisher was much affected and probably impressed by Gibbs’ physics 
methods. Thus, in order to complement the arguments in his doctoral thesis, he built 
an elaborate hydraulic machine with pumps and levers, allowing him to demonstrate 
visually how the equilibrium prices in the market adjusted in response to changes in 
supply or demand. More specifically, he devised a liquid dynamic model of the 
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behavior of prices in general equilibrium. In this  model, there are tubes connecting 
the various vessels of water  that represent the interrelations between supply and 
demand for different commodities. The equilibrium water level represents economic 
equilibrium (Tobin, 1987; Breslau, 2003). It is extremely interesting, that Fisher, did 
not think of this devise as an illustration, but believed in its direct relation to 
economic phenomena. As Breslau writes “There is nothing in either of these texts to 
indicate that the role of these mechanical models is any different from that of 
mathematical models, in making, and not simply illustrating, theoretical arguments”. 
(Breslau, 2003, p.397). The close analogy is repeated in Fisher’s The Purchasing 
Power of Money, where there is also another liquid dynamic model describing the 
monetary system. The model is used to demonstrate the  economic principle that the 
value of the bullion and the currency will tend to equilibrium (Fisher, 1911, pp.112-
148).  
The vector mathematics of Fisher’s professor Willard Gibbs, allowed for the 
commensuration of all demand, or indifference curves, in terms of homogeneous units 
of utility (Breslau, 2003, p.397). The following quotation provides the core of his 
methodological viewpoint. 
The introduction of  mathematical method marks a stage  of growth –perhaps it 
is not too extravagant to say , the entrance of political economy on a scientific 
era (Fisher, 1892 p., p. 85 or 1965, p.109). 
 
Apart from the above general position, Fisher, promoted the specific 
mathematical tool of optimization under constraints, that was to become standard in 
economic modeling.  As J. Tobin states: “On a remarkable range of topics, modern 
theorists adopt and build upon Fisherian ideas, sometimes unknowingly. Fisher’s 
methodologies, not just his use of mathematics but his explicit formulations  of 
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problems as constrained optimizations, is the accepted style of present-day theorizing 
(Tobin, 1985, p.34)”. This mathematical method was widely applied to problems in 
classical physics and especially classical mechanics.  
Furthermore, a substantial  number of pages in his  most important work are 
devoted  to demonstrate the direct analogies between economics and physics and 
especially mechanics.  Fisher was convinced that terms from physics correspond to 
terms in economics thus supporting explicitly the analogy between economics and 
classical mechanics. He presents a list of terms that economists use and which have 
been employed from physics. Examples are: equilibrium, stability, elasticity, 
expansion, inflation , reaction, distribution (price), levels, movement, friction (Fisher, 
1892, p.24). His next logical step is to construct a table of correspondence of terms 
and concepts between classical mechanics and economics.  
 
 
In Mechanics                                                               In Economics 
 
A Particle                                  corresponds to             An Individual 
Space                                                “                           Commodity 
Force                                                “                           Marg. Ut. or Disutility 
Work                                                “                           Disutility 
Energy                                              “                           Utility 
Work or Energy = Force x space     “                           Disutility or utility  =            
…….                                                                             MU x commodity                                                                         
 
Force is a vector                               “                           MU is a vector 
(dir. in space)                                                                (dir. in commodity)  
Forces are added by vector              “                            MU are added by 
addition.                                                                        vector addition 
 
Work and Energy are scalars           “                           Disut. and ut. are 
                                                                                      scalars 
 
Equilibrium will be where               “                           Equilibrium will be 
net energy is maximum                                                where gain is maximum 
 
(Fisher, 1892, pp.85-86) 
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The above table of correspondence between economics and physics does not serve as 
a mere indication of similarities. For Fisher, the fundamental approach towards the 
analysis of economic phenomena should be based on these concepts. As Breslau 
points out: “In all of these areas  (price formation, the monetary system, interest)  
Fisher proceeded by translating problems that had been understood in terms of 
differentiated social actors and goods, into terms of a mechanical system equilibrating 
a homogeneous substance (Breslau, 2003, p.399). For instance, in his discussion of 
the relationship between price, quantity and marginal utility, he uses the example of a 
cistern where the amount of liquid represents commodity and the distance of its 
surface from the top, its marginal utility (Fisher, 1892, p. 26). 
The direct analogies between economics and classical physics are not confined 
to Fisher’s most important work. In his  subsequent The Purchasing Power of Money, 
he assigns the quantity theory of money the status  of a an exact physical law. As he  
writes: 
 
Practically, this proposition [the quantity theory of money] is an exact law of 
proportion, as exact and as fundamental in economic science as the exact law of 
proportion between pressure and density of gases in physics, assuming 
temperature to remain the same. (Fisher ,1911, p.320) 
 
 
In the same manner, he repeats his conviction about the status of ‘laws’ in economics 
in his subsequent  and probably, his most well-known work The Theory of Interest. 
He states: 
Rational and empirical laws in economics are thus analogous to rational and 
empirical laws of physics or astronomy. Just as we may consider the actual 
behavior of the tides as a composite result of the rational Newtonian law of 
attraction of the moon and the empirical disturbances of continents, islands, 
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inlets, and so forth, so we may consider the actual behavior of the rates of 
interest in New York City as a composite of the rational laws of our second 
approximation and the empirical disturbances of Federal Reserve policy 
together with numberless other institutional, historical, legal, and practical 
factors. (Fisher, 1930, p.107). 
 
In a discussion among prominent American  economic theorists of  the period, Fisher 
presented his  views regarding the nature of the disciplines with such figures as  H. J. 
Davenport, W. H. Hamilton, Richard T. Ely, and B. M.Anderson, Jr. This discussion 
which was published in the American Economic Review, the physics ideal is present 
and clear. As he writes: 
One of the speakers has said that economics is not physics. No, but its method is 
the method of physics, and I believe a study of physics to be one of the best 
preparations for a young man intending to enter economic theory. The trouble 
with economic theory is that economists have entered the field, either from the a 
priori side of philosophy and metaphysics where the proper importance of cold 
facts has not been recognized, or on the other hand, from the side of history 
where only facts and not principles have been studied. (Davenport et al , 1916, 
p.167). 
 
  
Thus, in line with Edgeworth,  Fisher’s work  established a close connection between 
physics and economic concepts and furthermore, he introduced specific mathematical 
methods from classical physics to economics. These methods are widely used in 
contemporary economic theorizing.  More importantly, he provided an extensive 
methodological justification for the physics analogy in economics. In this respect, his 
approach had a major influence to the development of orthodox economic 
methodological viewpoint.  
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IV. The Methodological Influence of Edgeworth and  Fisher  
 
 The explicit references to the physics methodological ideal are not present in 
current economics. It seems that most orthodox economists are confident regarding 
the scientific status of the discipline in spite of  the widespread criticism. Thus, they 
do not feel the need to refer to the analogies from physics for methodological 
justification. However, the physics methodological ideal heavily promoted by 
Edgeworth and Fisher, has exerted considerable influence on many crucial aspects of 
the discipline (see also Mirowski, 1989). In our view, there are three important 
features of current mainstream economics which are heavily connected with the 
adoption of the physics ideal. These three are: the mathematization of economics, the 
hostility towards methodological discussion and the  negative attitude towards 
incorporating findings from other social sciences and especially from the related field 
of psychology.   
 
 
1. The Mathematization of Economics 
 
The close methodological analogies between economics and classical physics 
advocated by both Edgeworth and Fisher clearly facilitated the extensive use of 
mathematics in economic analysis. As was observed, the systematic use of 
mathematics was justified by both authors in terms of making economics more 
scientific in the manner of physics (see also Debreu, 1991; Turk, 2012). 
Edgeworth’s introduction and most importantly his methodological 
justification, of the calculus of variation (finding the maximum by using the signs of 
first second derivatives) is an indicative example in this respect. The use of Lagrange 
equations is another example of a mathematical method borrowed directly from 
classical mechanics. Furthermore, Fisher’s doctoral thesis  operated in the framework 
 14 
of Walrasian general equilibrium where he was able to apply the methods of vector 
calculus of his mentor, the physicist W. Gibbs. Fisher also explored in  great detail, 
the mathematics of utility functions maximization (see also Tobin, 1985). 
The subsequent use of these methods became standard especially after the 
publication of Samuelson’s Foundations. Samuelson himself admits to this influence 
in an essay dealing with the intellectual development of his seminal work: 
I was vaccinated early on to understand that economics and physics could share 
the same formal theorems (Euler’s theorem on homogeneous functions, 
Weierstrass’s theorems on constrained maxima, Jacobi determinant identities 
underlying Le Chatelier reactions, etc.), while still not resting on the same 
empirical foundations and certainties (Samuelson 1998, p. 1376). 
 
In the same conceptual framework, John von Neumann, who was very 
influential for the further development of formalism in economics, also advocated the 
use of the methods of physics to economic problems (von Neumann and Morgenstern 
1944, pp.3-7; see also Rashid, 1994). It is indicative that von Neumann held that even 
the most advanced theoretical works in economic theory at the time, were seriously 
lacking in mathematical rigor  in comparison to physics. As he writes in a  letter to O. 
Morgenstern: “Economics is simply still a million miles away from the state in which 
an advanced science is, such as physics” (Morgenstern 1976: p. 810).  
With above in mind, one can explain  the widespread use of the specific 
mathematical tools found in most contemporary mainstream economics texts. In 
particular, the main analytical technique of constraint optimization (taken directly 
from classical mechanics) is preferred over other analytical mathematical methods 
such as input-output matrices or Markov chains (see also Mirowski, 1984). The 
almost universally used nowadays concept of utility,  which for Edgeworth and Fisher  
corresponds to the classical notion of energy, can be viewed in the same framework, 
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although a number of authors have shown that the concept is not necessary for most 
contemporary formulations (e.g. Wong, 1978). In general, the  high degree of 
mathematization of contemporary mainstream economics has been the subject of  
much debate which focuses on the nature and method of the discipline (see for 
instance, Beed and Kane, 1991; Dow, 2012).  
 
 
2. Aversion to Methodology 
 
One can notice the  contemporary view popular among many mainstream 
theorists that questions concerning the method of economics are not worthy. For 
instance, in a series of well-known writings, Frank Hahn argued that the study of 
economic methodology is irrelevant (e.g. Hahn, 1992). Caldwell (1993), Lawson 
(1994) and Backhouse (2010) among many others, have addressed this issue pointing 
out the anti-methodology stance of mainstream economics is widely accepted without 
serious arguments (see also Hoover, 1995).  However, this hostility to economic 
methodology is not novel but  goes back to Fisher:  
 
It has long seemed to me that students of the social sciences, especially 
sociology and economics, have spent too much time in discussing what they call 
methodology. I have usually felt that the man who essays to tell the rest of us 
how to solve knotty problems would be more convincing if first he proved out 
his alleged method by solving a few himself. Apparently those would-be 
authorities who are forever telling others how to get results do not get any 
important results themselves. (Fisher, 1932, p. 1). 
 
A number of explanations regarding this negative attitude towards the study of 
economic methodology have been suggested. Ideological concerns, psychological 
motives, merely defensive responses through fear, or dislike, of criticism, the lack of 
any philosophical training, and sheer ignorance, are some of the reasons mentioned in 
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the literature (see for instance, Lawson, 1994). The physics scientific ideal  is also 
relevant in explaining the general hostility towards the study of economic 
methodology. The scientific prestige of physics and thus of the economics of 
Edgeworth and Fisher, makes methodological discussion and critique obsolete, in the 
sense that it shields economics from methodological attacks. Most mainstream 
economists are content with the methodological outline provided by Friedman’s 
(1953) essay which effectively dismisses any methodological discourse concerning 
the role of assumptions in economics.    It is indicative that in  this essay, Friedman 
also uses the analogy of physical sciences in his effort to construct the methodological 
basis of positive economics:  
In short, positive economics is, or can be, an "objective" science, in precisely 
the same sense as any of the physical sciences. (Friedman, 1953, p.4)  
 
Thus, the mainstream perception is that the high scientific status of economics 
deriving from its close analogies to physics,  renders any methodological discussion 
obsolete. Although some methodologists argue that there are some signs of an 
increased interest to economic methodology (e.g. Wade Hands, 2001), aversion to 
such issues is still a feature of mainstream thinking.  
 
3. Anti-Psychologism 
 
Another consequence of the classical physics methodological ideal was the 
rejection of findings from other social sciences and especially from psychology. As 
was discussed, Edgeworth was in favor of  incorporating psychological findings, but 
this stance should be seen in the context of his overall methodological perspective. 
More specifically, Edgeworth viewed psychological phenomena as a legitimate field 
for the application of mathematical tools. Thus, his willingness to link ‘hedonic 
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calculus’ from  psychophysics  to utilitarian calculus in economics. On the contrary 
however,  Fisher was clearly against the inclusion of    psychological concepts in  
economics. As he writes in the beginning of his Investigations: 
 To fix the idea of utility the economist should go no farther than is serviceable 
in explaining economic facts. It is not his province to build a theory of 
psychology (Fisher, 1892, p.11).  
 
The differences in attitudes are due to the fact that Fisher thought of psychology  as a 
‘soft’ subject not worthy for consideration by the hard science of economics. In this 
sense, the following statement is indicative: 
But the economist need not envelope his own science in the hazes of ethics, 
psychology , biology and metaphysics (Fisher, 1892, p.23). 
 
In the same conceptual tradition, Pareto believed that the construction of the 
fictional model of economic man was adequate for the needs of  economic theory, 
thus clearly  implying that psychological findings are not necessary (Pareto, 1971;see 
also Bruni and Guala, 2001; McLure, 2010).  In more modern times, one of the main 
aims of Samuelson’s revealed preference theory was to dismiss the alleged 
psychological concepts of utility theory (Samuelson, 1938, pp.61-62; Samuelson, 
1947). This clearly indicates that a psychology-free economics was a very important 
methodological goal of Samuelson’s work (see also Wong, 1978; Drakopoulos, 
1997). During the  same period, Hicks also attempts to construct a theory of choice 
without any reference to the subjective and psychological assumptions of marginalist 
utility theory. In his main work, Value and Capital, the aim of psychology-free 
economic theory is clear: 
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In order to get clear-cut results in economic theory, we must work with concepts 
which are directly dependent on the individual's scale of preferences, not on any 
vaguer properties of his psychology (Hicks, 1939, p.177) 
  
The dismissal of psychological findings was linked to the aim of the scientific 
character of economics. The rejection of all “metaphysical and psychological 
elements” was one of the main requirements for the establishment of the ‘scientific’ 
status of economics. An additional  reason for the tendency to separate economics 
from other social sciences, including psychology, has to do with the perception of 
economics as the most advanced of the social sciences, and hence the one that is 
closest to the physical sciences (Seligman, 1969; Dow, 2002, pp. 170–175). The anti-
psychologism bias of mainstream economics is also closely linked to the irrelevance 
of the assumptions thesis expressed in M. Friedman’s (1953) well-known paper. The 
central idea here is that the realism of behavioural assumptions in economics does not 
matter as long as aggregate data behaves as if these assumptions were accurate 
(Friedman, 1953). This clearly implies that findings from psychology are nor relevant 
for economics given that assumptions do not matter for the validity of the  theory.  
Thus, anti-psychologism as a widely accepted methodological position, 
provided a strong shield from criticism targeting the behavioural foundations of 
mainstream economics. Furthermore, it provided  support for the pure ‘economic’ 
approach to human behaviour, which is seen as extremely successful and superior 
compared to other social sciences (for a detailed account of the uneasy relationship 
between mainstream economics and psychology, see Lewin, 1996;  Rabin, 2002). 
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VI Concluding Comments 
Although analogies between economics and physics can be found in a number 
of classical and marginalist authors, Edgeworth’s and Fisher’s works represent the 
highest point of classical physics imitation. These two influential economists 
transferred important terms and concepts from classical physics to economics. In 
addition, they provided the methodological grounding for the adoption of the physics 
scientific ideal in mainstream economics. This scientific ideal was extremely 
influential for the formation of current mainstream economics thinking as was seen 
through the works of Samuelson, Friedman, von Neumann and others. It was also 
seen that there were   important consequences of this methodological stance  which 
are the following: 1) the physics ideal meant that economics should adopt the 
established mathematical methods from physics. This was one of the most important 
reasons for the increased mathematization of economic theory. 2) The status of 
mainstream economics as a ‘hard’ science led to the relegation of the methodological 
discussion concerning the status of orthodox theory. Furthermore, the anti-
methodology stance shields mainstream economics from heterodox attacks. 3) The 
‘hard’ science status also implies that economics does not need to adopt findings, 
concepts, or generally ideas from other ‘soft’ social fields like psychology.  
In general, the arguments presented in the paper might contribute to the better 
understanding of the role of the physics scientific ideal in shaping important elements 
of  contemporary mainstream economic theorizing. The discussion might also 
contribute to the methodological debate concerning the role of the scientific ideal in 
mainstream economics. 
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